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Abstract
The equilibrium of a competitive market in which rms must choose prices
ex ante and demand is stochastic is shown to be second-best ine¢ cient. Even
under risk neutrality, equilibrium price exceeds the welfare-maximising prede-
termined price. Competition tends to eliminate rationing, but at the greater
welfare cost of creating excess capacity. Entry incentives are also distorted. In
low states, entrants obtain a share of revenue without increasing consumption,
giving rise to a version of the common pool problem. In high states, rms
do not appropriate the consumer surplus gained from marginal reductions in
rationing. As a result of these o¤setting externalities, the number of rms may
be excessive or insu¢ cient. Ine¢ ciency arises whether or not the rationing rule
is e¢ cient.
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Introduction
Restaurants typically set prices before knowing how many customers turn up on a
particular night. Sometimes they run out of specic dishes, other times they throw
food away. Granted that for good reasons prices are set ex ante, does competition
lead to an e¢ cient outcome?1 This paper shows that market failure is endemic, even
under universal risk neutrality. The ex ante price that maximizes expected welfare
does not normally coincide with the price in an atomistic equilibrium.2 Waste is
socially excessive and rationing insu¢ cient. Moreover, the number of active rms
in a competitive equilibrium may not be welfare maximizing. As demand is never
entirely certain and it necessarily takes time to adjust price, the systematic market
failure identied here is potentially widespread.
The setup involves rms with xed capacity selling homogeneous goods to iden-
tical consumers. Firms are su¢ ciently small they have negligible impact on the rest
of the market. Consumers know prices and can only visit one rm per period. If
demand is certain and the number of rms is su¢ ciently large, as shown in Section
4 of Peck (2016), these assumptions yield a socially e¢ cient, market-clearing Nash
equilibrium in prices, identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We show that the con-
sequence of introducing aggregate demand shocks is that the equilibrium is not even
second-best e¢ cient. Firms are competitive in that they can sell to as many buy-
ers as they want, as long as they deliver to each of them the equilibrium expected
utility.3 Utility taking does not, however, imply price taking. As Carlton (1978)
noted, a rm charging more than rivals loses customers but this is compensated by a
reduction in the probability of being rationed. So not all sales are lost. Conversely,
deep price cuts may be necessary to utilize capacity in low demand states. This
is privately expensive in terms of lost high-state revenue. The potential gains to
consumers from better capacity utilization in low demand states are not captured
by rms, so price tends to be above the welfare maximizing level, which in turn dis-
torts entry incentives. In low-demand states, an entrant captures a share of revenue,
1Fixing prices ex ante may be due to menu costs, rational inattention due to di¢ culty of judging
state, credibly preventing consumer hold-up, avoiding adverse behavioral responses from consumers,
as in the snow shovel case of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986).
2Under risk neutrality, the appropriate welfare criterion is expected surplus. Risk aversion
requires weighting of gains and losses. Typically, there is a missing risk market and therefore
market failure is immediate.
3The market cannot clear in all states if price must be set ex ante, so the concept of Walrasian
equilibrium is not directly applicable. Instead, competition is again taken as Nash equilibrium with
large numbers of rms. For example Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) title their seminal paper "Equi-
librium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information",
although the equilibrium is not Walrasian.
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but as there is already excess capacity, does not contribute any net benet. This
incentive to excess entry is analogous to the common pool problem. Counteracting
this distortion, entry relieves rationing in high demand states. Not all of the social
benet of the increased industry capacity is obtained by an entrant as the surplus of
the newly unrationed consumers is not part of the rms gain. The balance between
these externalities determines whether equilibrium involves too much waste or too
much rationing. Unlike Carlton, we conclude that equilibrium is not e¢ cient.
The paper is in four sections. Section 1 presents two simple models of rationing
and waste with unit demand. Section 2 extends the models to smooth demand
functions. The main result is that the equilibrium price will almost never be e¢ -
cient, even with atomistic rms. Entry distortions are then analysed. To this point,
the rationing rule has been rst-come-fully-served. It is shown that even with e¢ -
cient rationing (everyone gets an equal share of the available stock), the competitive
equilibrium is ine¢ cient.4 In another modication, if consumers select the seller
subsequent to inferring the demand state, ine¢ ciency still arises. Section 3 places
results in the context of the literature. Section 4 draws some brief conclusions.
1 Unit-demand
1.1 Shocks a¤ect all consumers equally
A continuum of identical consumers of measure M demand at most one unit of the
good. Willingness to pay, v, depends on the macro state, with support [v; v] and
probability density function f(v). There are N rms, each with capacity K, initially
assumed costless, so all rms are active. As M > NK, not all consumers can be
served.
The timeline is: 1) sellers simultaneously post prices to maximize expected prots; 2)
consumers observe the price and make simultaneous choices of which seller to visit.
Only one seller can be visited per period; 3) the state is revealed (in Sub-section 2.6,
the order of 2 and 3 is reversed). As in Deneckere and Peck (1995), given prices,
consumerschoice of seller is a Nash equilibrium whilst sellerschoice of price is a
Nash equilibrium. Everyone is risk neutral.
4Given the assumptions here, a seller could deduce the state from the demand of the rst
customer making it relatively easy to administer e¢ cient rationing. Adding idiosyncratic risk to
sequential arrivals would make this di¢ cult. Burguet and Sakovics (2016) show that if sellers can
make personalised o¤ers, the unique equilibrium is the market clearing price, thereby avoiding
the need to specify a rationing rule. Personalised o¤ers may not be easily implemented though,
especially where there are ex post macro demand shocks.
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Determining the socially optimal price, pw, is straightforward. If price exceeds
v, a reduction has no e¤ect on aggregate surplus (prot plus consumer surplus) in
states in which sales were already made, but creates value in the states in which sales
are newly made. So, to maximise total surplus, pw  v.
Turning to equilibrium, suppose all rms charge p. In states with v > p, each
seller hasM=N customers, who all attempt to buy, but onlyK of them can be served:
Revenue per rm is
pK
vZ
p
f(v)dv. (1)
Consider a rm deviating to price p in the vicinity of p. If p > p, it attracts
more consumers and it sells out in all states with p < v. When p < p, fewer
consumers nd the rm attractive, though this is o¤set by the lower probability of
rationing, so the reduction in demand is nite.5 If the upward deviation is small,
fewer customers choose that seller but it still faces excess demand, selling out in all
states with p < v.6 The deviants revenue is therefore
pK
vZ
p
f(v)dv. (2)
Taking the derivative with respect to p, if there is an interior equilibrium, price, pc,
must satisfy
vZ
pc
f(v)dv   pcf(pc) = 0. (3)
It will normally be the case that the left-hand side of (3) is positive at pc, certainly
if the tails of the distribution thin out. Even in the case of a uniform distribution,
pc = 0:5v, so if 2v < v, the equilibrium price exceeds the socially optimal price.
Note that the equilibrium price is independent of the number of rms, as long as
N < M=K.7 Rationing implies that every rm has a local monopoly. Even if many
5Given that N is large, dispersal of the deviants customers across the other rms has negligible
e¤ect on the expected utility they provide. The number of consumers selecting the deviant is
therefore m, dm=dp =  M=(v   p)N .
6There is a threshold, p, at which rationing is eliminated and above which demand is zero.
Such a large upward deviation cannot be protable.
7This property is not true of other distributions, but allows for easy illustration of possibilities.
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rms sell an identical product, the equilibrium coincides with the price set if there
were a single owner of all the rms.8 Increasing the number of rms, whilst decreasing
the capacity of each to keep NK constant, does not a¤ect equilibrium price, contrary
to the usual expectation that making rms smaller and more numerous intensies
competition and drives price down.
Turning to entry, suppose initially that the cost of capacity is the same for all
rms. First rms decide whether to enter, then they make simultaneous price choices,
then consumers choose where buy and nally the state is revealed.9 It follows from
price being invariant to N in the rationing zone, that either no rms are active or
else there is no rationing. An equilibrium with no sales is not necessarily socially
optimal. Selling out in all states with pc > v creates consumption value at no cost.
In the uniform case, an extra rm charging v creates value 0:5 (v + v)K, whereas the
revenue earned from charging the equilibrium price is 0:5vK. Hence, if capacity cost,
C, is such that 0:5vK < C < 0:5 (v + v)K, there is no industry though it would
be socially e¢ cient to create one. Normally, it is economies of scale that create
such situations but here, however small the capacity of individual rms, the problem
remains.
A free entry equilibrium with positive rationing may arise if rms di¤er in their
capacity costs. The Nth most e¢ cient rm has capacity cost C(N), with C 0(N) > 0.
So, if 0:5vK = C(N) andNK < M , there will be a rationing equilibrium. An extra
rm reduces rationing in all states with pc < v, creating nite consumer surplus, so
subsidising entry is expected welfare improving.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price exceeds the socially optimal price, given NK <
M , and is invariant to N . There will be insu¢ cent entry from the social perspective
and possibly no rms active, even though a large industry may be socially optimal.
1.2 Shocks a¤ect consumers di¤erentially
Aggregate shocks may have random e¤ects on ex ante identical consumers. The nat-
ural assumption is that the distribution of valuations associated with a less negative
shock rst-order dominates that with a more positive shock. Carlton (1978) and
8The result is reminiscent of Diamonds (1971) result that, in a search model with arbitrarily
large numbers of sellers, the equilibrium price equals the monopoly price. In both cases, rms do
not lose customers from an incremental price increase, but the mechanism is di¤erent. In our case
consumers know price before choosing a supplier so a marginal price change does a¤ect the number
of consumers. The monopoly result does not generalise to other rationing models as will be shown.
9Instead of entry, the results are the same if the number of rms is xed but at the rst stage
they choose capacity and this is observed by buyers,
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Denekere and Peck (1998) consider the case that consumers are either una¤ected by
a shock or else so adversely they do not value the good at all. The worse the shock,
the higher the proportion of a¤ected consumers. This is the rst case considered
with modications then analysed.
There are two states. In the high state, which occurs with probability x, all N
consumers value the good at v. The low state involves a fraction f of the consumers
valuing the good at v and the rest at v. Once again, M > NK. Also, fM < NK,
so there is enough capacity to satisfy all active consumers in the low-state.
Assume rst that v = 0. To nd a pure-strategy equilibrium, suppose one seller
charges p when all others charge p. The surplus enjoyed by a customer of the p
seller is10
S = x(v   p)NK
M
+ (1  x)f(v   p), (4)
where NK=M is the probability of being served in the high state. The number of
customers, m(p; p), chosing the p seller must therefore satisfy
x(v   p) K
m(p; p)
+ (1  x)f(v   p) = x(v   p)NK
M
+ (1  x)f(v   p). (5)
implying that
m(p; p) =
x(v   p)MK
(1  x)f(p   p)M + x(v   p)NK . (6)
which is decreasing in p. The (gross) prot of the p seller is
(p; p) = xpK + (1  x)fpm(p; p) =
= .xpK + (1  x)fp x(v   p
)MK
(1  x)f(p   p)M + x(v   p)NK . (7)
Di¤erentiating (7) writh respect to p, and then setting p = p = pc, at an interior
equilibrium,
[(1  x)fM + xNK][x(v   pc)NK   (1  x)fMpc]
x(v   pc)N2K = 0, (8)
yielding equilibrium price
pc =
xNKv
(1  x)fM + xNK < v. (9)
10Appendix A shows that we obtain the same analytical results using the Bayesrule for calcu-
lating the customers expected surplus.
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Substituting pc for p in (7),
(p; pc) = xKv. (10)
Given that the other rms charge pc, the prot of a seller is independent of its price
as long as it is in the interval that leads to rationing and waste. Outside this interval
prot is lower. A deviation price below that at which a seller is at full capacity in
the low state is clearly less protable than the price at which capacity is just used
and eliminating rationing by charging above v results in zero revenue. It follows that
(8) does identify the unique pure-strategy price equilibrium.
Notice that from (9), price rises asN increases. With more entry, each seller has fewer
low-state customers and therefore gives more weight to the price that is appropriate
to the high state. This means price is increased, which just o¤sets the e¤ect on prot
of the decline in each rms low-state demand .
As price is below v, it is socially e¢ cient. Adding another seller relaxes high-state
rationing, augmenting expected social benet by xKv, equal to gross revenue: Hence,
the equilibrium is fully e¢ cient. This is a special case, however.
When v > 0, the equilibrium price and entry may be socially ine¢ cient. The
rst task is to determine the welfare maximising price. At rst sight this should be
v or below to make full use of capacity. This though implies rationing in the low
state. Assuming it is random who gets served of those wanting to buy, some low
valuation types displace those with a higher valuation. It might be preferable to set
price above v to improve selection, even if total sales are thereby lower. At a price
below v, average value in the low state is fv+ (1  f)v. The lowest v for which it is
welfare maximising to set price lower is
vl =
vf (M  NK)
(1  f)NK . (11)
It will now be shown that it is possible that v > vl so it is e¢ cient to set a low price
yet the equilibrium remains at pc > v: As a deviants price falls from the candidate
equilibrium pc, there comes a level, pl, at which the deviant sells out in the low state.
This occurs when m(pl; pc) = K, implying
pl = xv. (12)
If pl > v, deviation from pc to bring in the low value types is certainly unprotable
and therefore equilibrium remains at pc. So, if pl > vl, there is an interval into which
v can fall such that equilibrium price is ine¢ ciently high. From (11) and (12), pl > vl
i¤
f <
xNK
M   (1  x)NK . (13)
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When the welfare maximising price is below v, it is socially e¢ cient to have rationing
in both states. The social value of an extra seller includes the value of low state sales
and is (1  x) [fv + (1   f)v]K + xvK. In a pc equilibrium, sales are only made
in the high state and prot is xvK. Hence, if heterogeneous set up costs lead to
an equilibrium with rationing and waste, entry is below the socially e¢ cient level
(although without price regulation, an entry subsidy would lower welfare).
Proposition 2 If the competitive price involves rationing and waste, it rises with
entry although not to the monopoly level, v. If (13) holds, so pl > v > vl, and a
competitive industry is in equilibrium in the rationing/waste regime, the competitive
price exceeds the socially e¢ cient price (which involves rationing but not waste). For
social e¢ ciency, entry should exceed the competitive level.
2 Smooth demand
When goods are perfectly divisible, it becomes apparent that ine¢ ciency is generic.
It can also be shown that entry may be excessive. Prot functions are typically
not well behaved, making it necessary to use an explicit functional form, here linear
demand.
The basic set up is as before. There are two macro states: in the high-state,
which occurs with probability x, individual demand is q = a   bp, where p is price;
in the low-state, the demand is q = ad   bcp. Demand curves cross unless c  d.
If c = d < 1, elasticity at every price is the same in both states. More plausibly, if
c = 1, d < 1, willingness to pay in the low state is reduced by the same percentage
at all quantities (and therefore at any given price, elasticity is higher).11 If there is
excess demand at a shop, the rationing rule is rst-come, fully-served (an alternative,
"e¢ cient rationing" is considered in Sub-section 2.5). With multiple units demanded,
eliminating rationing is e¢ ciency enhancing as the consumption value of the stock
is increased.
2.1 Socially optimal price
The price that maximises aggregate welfare given the number of rms cannot involve
a price so high that there is waste in both states as the extra consumption from a
lower price is costless. Nor can it be optimal to set price so low there is rationing
11The unchanged elasticity case can also be interpreted as some consumers drop out of the market
in the low state with demand by the remainder una¤ected.
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in both states.12 Since marginal consumption is the least valuable, raising price
increases the aggregate value of consumption even though the total number of units
supplied is xed. Hence, there are three possible optimal regimes: (i) rationing in
the high state and waste in the low state; (ii) market clearing in the high state and
waste in the low state; (iii) market clearing in the low state and rationing in the
high state. The rationing/waste regime is central, with its range dening where the
other regimes take over. Attention is therefore focussed on (i), in which a higher
price enables more customers to be served in the high state which, despite each
unrationed consumer buying less, increases the average utility value of consumption.
The welfare cost of a higher price is the lost consumption in the low state. For social
optimallity, price should be increased to the point that the value of the marginal loss
of consumption in the low state equals the value of the more e¢ cient consumption
in the high state.
To maximise expected surplus, it is optimal that all rms charge the same price.13
Every shop has an equal number of potential customers and, in a rationing/waste
regime, the total value (area under the individualsdemand curve) of all goods con-
sumed is
W = x
(a  bp)(a+ bp)
2b
NK
a  bp + (1  x)
(ad  bcp)(ad+ bcp)
2bc
M , (14)
where NK=(a   bp) is the number of customers served in the high state. At a
maximum,
dW
dp
=
xNK
2
  (1  x)bcpM = 0, (15)
yielding welfare maximising price
pw =
xNK
2(1  x)bcM . (16)
It is easily checked that the second-order condition necessarily holds at pw.14
The parameter d, which only a¤ects demand in the low state and not its slope,
does not appear in (16). As the welfare e¤ect of an innitesimal price change is
12Rationing involves ine¢ ciency since the value of the marginal consumption of served consumers
is less than the average consumption value of excluded consumers. Under unit demand, this ine¢ -
ciency would not arise.
13Introducing a second price in addition to pw and maximising welfare with respect to the pro-
portion of sales at the new price yields an optimum at zero.
14The second-order condition is d2W=dp2 =  (1  x)bcM < 0.
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proportional to the change in low-state sales (pdq=dp =  pbc), which does not depend
on d, neither does pw.
For pw to be within the rationing/waste regime,
M(a  bpw) > NK and M(ad  bcpw) < NK, (17)
or
a =
2(1  x)cNK + xNK
2(1  x)cM < a <
(2  x)NK
2(1  x)dM = a. (18)
The length of the interval within which a must fall if the rationing/waste regime
applies is therefore
a  a = [c(2  x  2(1  x)d)  xd]NK
2(1  x)cdM . (19)
Should c = d, then a  a = (1  c)NK=cM > 0, implying that for a rationing/waste
regime to be welfare maximising, it is required that c < 1. When a > a, it is welfare
maximising to set price to clear the market in the high state and when a < a, it is
optimal to set price to clear the market in the low state.
An immediate feature of (16) is that the welfare maximising price is increasing in
the number of rms. Given the price, as the number of rms rises, the number of
customers served in the high-state increases. This means that the benet of raising
price through more e¢ cient rationing is greater the more rms there are. As low-
state sales are independent of the number of rms, the welfare cost of increasing
price is independent of the number of rms.
2.2 Competitive price
A SPNE in prices is sought. At the rst stage, rms make simultaneous price choices.
Then, at the second stage, consumers distribute themselves across rms to equalize
their expected utility, as in Deneckere and Peck (1995). The consequences of a rm
o¤ering a di¤erent price to its rivals depend on the regime. If a proposed pure-
strategy symmetric equilibrium has rationing in the high state and waste in the low
state, a lower price will attract extra consumers, but only a limited number of them,
as the attraction of the lower price will be o¤set by an increased chance of rationing.
If m(p; p) consumers patronise a particular rm charging p, each of them has
expected surplus
S = x

(a  bp)(a+ bp)
2b
  p(a  bp)

K
(a  bp)m(p; p)
+(1  x)

(ad  bcp)(ad+ bcp)
2bc
  p(ad  bcp)

, (20)
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where the term in the rst brackets is the surplus obtained in the high state if a
consumer is served, K=(a   bp)m(p; p) is the probability of being served, and the
term in the second brackets is the surplus in the low state. Consumers distribute
themselves between rms to maximise their utility given the choices of others. In a
competitive equilibrium, rms are utility takers, so a price change by an individual
store has a negligible e¤ect the surplus obtained from the other shops. In response
to a change in the price of an individual store, the number of customers per store,
m(p; p), must therefore adjust to maintain the expected surplus from visiting it.
From (20),
dm(p; p)
dp
=  b[2(1  x)(ad  bcp
)m(p; p) + xK]m(p; p)
x(a  bp)K , (21)
given the price charged by its competitors. In a rationing/waste equilibrium, every
shop sells out in the high-state, so the rms expected prot (revenue) is
(p; p) = xpK + (1  x)(ad  bcp)pm(p; p). (22)
The necessary condition for prot-maximisation by an individual rm, given the
price of its competitors, is therefore
d(p; p)
dp
= xK+(1 x)

(ad  2bcp)m(p; p) + p(ad  bcp)dm(p
; p)
dp

= 0. (23)
In a symmetric Nash, rationing/waste equilibrium, m(p; p) = M=N , and from (23)
it follows that if there is an equilibrium price in this regime, pc, it satises
xK + (1  x)M
N
"
(ad  2bcpc)  pc(ad  bcpc)b[2(1  x)
M
N
(ad  bcpc) + xK]
x(a  bpc)K
#
= 0.
(24)
For pc to be an equilibrium, the second-order condition for the individual rms must
also be satised, an issue addressed below.
2.3 The e¢ ciency of competitive equilibrium
A tractable closed form solution for the competitive price, pc, is not available, but
evaluating (23) at p = pw, m(p; pw) =M=N , and simplifying,
d(p; pw)
dp
=
2(1  x)2a2d(c  d)M2
[2(1  x)acM   xKN ]N . (25)
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From (25), it is immediate that pw 6= pc if c 6= d. The numerator of (25) is positive
and the denominator is positive if a > xNK=2(1  x)cM = ea. We have that a ea =
NK=M > 0, hence, if welfare maximisation involves rationing/waste, pw is not an
equilibrium. When c = d, at rst sight the equilibrium is e¢ cient, but although the
FOC for pw and pc coincide, the SOC for the rmsindividual maximisation problem
cannot be satised. Specically, the SOC evaluated at p = pw, m(p; pw) = M=N ,
and c = d is
d2(p; pw)
dp2
=
(1  x)[2(1  x)acM + xNK]bcM
[2(1  x)acM   xNK]N . (26)
The numerator of (26) is positive, and again the denominator is positive if a > ea.
Hence, pw is not an equilibrium even if c = d. In addition, it is impossible that there
can be an equilibrium in which the equilibrium price is below the welfare maximising
price. From (25), at pw, 1(pw; pw) > 0. In Appendix B we show that 1(p; pw) > 0
for all p < pw. Hence, the result follows and an equilibrium must involve excessive
waste.
Proposition 3 If the number of rms is xed and welfare maximisation involves
rationing/waste, equilibrium involves an ine¢ ciently high price.
Prot functions are not well behaved, making it hard to nd equilibria. One
possibility, associated with low d, is that the SOC of the invidual rms hold at the
solution to (25). Small deviations are then unprotable, but large upward price
deviations into the zone where there are no low-state sales are advantageous. An
equilibrium at the market-clearing price in the high state, ph = (aM   NK)=bM ,
may then exist. The Figure reports parameter values that generate this outcome and
plots the relevant functions. The rst panel shows shows welfare (expected prot plus
expected surplus) as a function of price. Below the market-clearing price in the low
state, pl = (adM NK)=bcM , capacity is fully used even in the low-state. Above ph,
rationing is eliminated in the high-state. When price exceeds p0 = ad=bc, demand
is zero in the low state. Beyond p0, price increases raise allocative e¢ ciency by
distributing the stock of the good to more consumers, so raising average consumption
value. Welfare would denitely drop above ph, as there is no gain to leaving some
of the good unsold in the high-state. In this case, welfare is maximised at pw, in the
rationing/waste regime.
The second panel shows the prot function of an individual rm for p  ph when all
other rms charge ph. Initial price cuts are insu¢ cient to attract low-state sales so
lower prot. At prices below p0, such sales are attracted despite m(p; ph) > M=N ,
but the price e¤ect dominates and decline to p = [adm(p; ph) K]=bcm(p; ph), where
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the deviant sells out in the low state.15 Below p, prot falls proportionately with
price. Above ph, consumers cannot be compensated with lower rationing for a higher
price, so demand collapses to zero.16 It follows that ph is an equilibrium.
The nal panel shows the deviants prot when all other rms charge pc. Small
deviations are unprotable, but a deviation to the price where the deviant sells out
in the high state, p = [am(p; pc) K]=bm(p; pc), breaks the equilibrium17 (the price
at which the deviant sells out in the low state is not the same as in the second panel
as the deviation is from a di¤erent price18).
Proposition 4 If the number of rms is xed and the welfare maximising price
involves rationing/waste, it is possible that the market equilibrium is at ph > pw,
with rationing eliminated.
When d is relatively high, the SOC may not hold at the solution of (25). There
may not be an equilibrium at ph either as not too much of aprice cut is needed to
capture substantial low-state sales. In addition, pl is not an equilibrium as high-
state rationing is high and the discouragement e¤ect of a price increase is easily
o¤set by a reduction in high-state rationing. It is therefore possible that no single
price equilibrium exists. The parameter set of the gure with d increased to 0.49 has
this property. In these cases we conjecture that equilibrium involves a continuum of
prices at the highest of which there is no rationing and at the lowest, no waste. As a
step to showing this, we looked at examples where the SOC does not hold at pc but
resticted rms to choosing either pc or a nitely di¤erent price. If the two prices are
not too di¤erent, in equilibrium some rms o¤er the higher price with low rationing
and others the low price, o¤set for consumers by higher rationing.
15The deviants price p derives from (ad  bcp)m(p; ph) = K. At the deviants m(p; ph), when all
other rms charge ph, we have
p = adbc  K 2xcN
2K
xa(c d)M2+
p
4xcM2N2K2+(xa(c d)M2)2 .
16Consumers of the deviant distribute themselves over the large number of remaining rms cre-
ating negligible rationing at each and therefore no change in the surplus available there. See Peck
(2016, Section 4) for the similar deterministic case.
17The deviants price p derives from (a   bp)m(p; pc) = K. At the deviants m(p; pc), when all
other rms charge pc in the rationing/waste zone, we have
p =
a 
p
(1 x)a2d2M+bcpc((1 x)bcMp xNK) ac(2(1 x)bdMpc xNK)p
x
p
c
p
M
b ,
where p is the price of rivals.
18At the deviants m(p; pc), when all other rms charge a price in the rationing/waste zone, we
have
p =
aMK(xc+(2 x)d) 
p
MK2(4bcpc((1 x)bcpcM xNK)) 4ac(2(1 x)bdpcM xNK)+a2M(4(1 x)d2+x2(c d)2))
2bcMK ,
where pc is the price of rivals.
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2.4 Entry
So far, the number of rms has been xed. Once again, let rms di¤er in their
capacity costs. The Nth most e¢ cient rm has capacity cost C(N), with C 0(N) >
0.19 As a rst step in establishing whether equilibrium is e¢ cient, at the welfare
optimum (with the optimal ex ante price),
dW (pw(N); N)
dN
  C 0(N) = x[2(1  x)acM + xKN ]K
4(1  x)bcM   C
0(N) = 0. (27)
Market entry is driven by prot which, evaluated at a ph equilibrium and common
N , yields
dW (pw)
dN
  (ph; ph) = x[NK(4(1  x)c+ x)  2(1  x)acM ]K
4(1  x)bcM .
The sign of this expression is ambiguous even when evaluated at parameter sets
at which pw involves rationing/waste and a ph equilibrium, as numerical examples
conrm. In particular when the number of rms is low, the protability of the no
rationing equilibrium is high, leading to excess entry.
Proposition 5 If welfare maximisation involves rationing/waste, equilibrium entry
may be above or below the socially e¢ cient level.
In the numerical case above, given N , a monopolist would also set price at ph,
which is market clearing in the high state. Unlike the unit demand case, entry lowers
price so as to maintain market clearing in the high state. Under competition, entry
proceeds till the marginal rm just covers its cost. A monopolist recognises that
this entrant depresses the prot of existing rms. So, as usual, a monopolist chooses
lower industry capacity and higher price than a competitive industry.20
2.5 E¢ cient rationing
It might be thought that the ine¢ ciency of equilibrium is due to the nature of the
rationing. It has so far been assumed that consumers buy all they want at the
19It follows from (14) and (16) that W is increasing in N so, for an internal solution, C 0(N) must
be su¢ ciently high.
20Under competition, if N = 280, rather than 230, the equilibrium is still at ph, but a monopolist
would set price above the new ph. That is, under monopoly, there would be waste in both states,
but in the competitive solution only in the low demand state. Of course, the monopolist would
then cut N below 280, so again its capacity would be below the competitive level and price higher.
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ruling price or else obtain nothing at all. An alternative, if feasible, is that if there
is excess demand, everyone obtains an equal share of the available supply. This
procedure equalises the value of marginal consumption which, granted downward
sloping demand, maximises total consumption value. Under e¢ cient rationing, price
should be set to clear the market in the low state, zero if there are still unsold stocks
when the good is free. This latter case is easy to analyse. Though the e¢ cient price
is zero, this cannot be an equilibrium. A rm deviating by setting a positive price
still makes some sales as its remaining consumers obtain more of the good in the
high state. Its prots are therefore increased by deviation. More formally, assuming
that even at zero price there is excess demand in the low state, but excess demand
in the high price, with everyone having an equal share,
W = x
2aM
N
K  K2
2b
 
M
N
2 M + (1  x)(ad  bcp)(ad+ bcp)2bc M , (28)
where the surplus measure in the high state is the area below the demand curve
between 0 and NK=M . From (28),
dW
dp
=  (1  x)bcpM < 0. (29)
The e¢ cient price is therefore zero. At any price above zero consumption is lost in
the low state without gain, whilst in the high state consumption is unchanged (unless
price is so high that there is excess supply in which case there is a welfare loss in
both states). Turning to equilibrium,
S = x

2am(p; p)K  K2
2bm2(p; p)
  p K
m(p; p)

+(1  x)

(ad  bcp)(ad+ bcp)
2bc
  p(ad  bcp)

, (30)
where the surplus area in the high state is calculated from 0 to K=m(p; p). From
(20),
dm(p; p)
dp
=   [(1  x)(ad  bcp
)m(p; p) + xK]bm2(p; p)
x[(a  bp)m(p; p) K]K . (31)
The equilibrium condition is,
d(p; p)
dp
= xK (1 x)bcpm(p; p)+(1 x)(ad bcp)

m(p; p) + p
dm(p; p)
dp

= 0,
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which evaluated at the welfare maximising price of zero, yields
d(p; 0)
dp
= xK + (1  x)adM
N
> 0. (32)
Proposition 6 Under e¢ cient rationing, the equilibrium may not be e¢ cient.
When market clearing in the low state involves a positive price, it is possible but
not necessary that pc = pw.21
2.6 Consumers choose supplier post realisation
If consumers know their demand before choosing where to buy but the other assump-
tions are maintained they can infer the macro state. Assuming rms must still set
price prior to the realisation, the welfare maximising price remains unchanged, but
the equilibrium is di¤erent. Price cannot exceed market clearing in the low state. If
it did, an individual rm cutting price by an innitesimal amount would sell out in
the low state so increase its prot. If price is raised above the market clearing level,
no buyer would select the rm in the low state as rationing at these rms would
be innitesimal.22 Thus, the equilibrium price is low-state market clearing.23 From
(18), the welfare maximising price is above the market clearing price in the low state
if
a > a =
2(1  x)cNK + xNK
2(1  x)cM . (33)
21In this case, adM > NK. Substituting the market clearing price in the shops equilibrium
condition,
d(p;p)
dp =
 (x(1 x)a2(c d)dM2 N2K2(1+x 2cx x2(1 c))+aNKM(d+x(2 c)d xc(2 x) x2(2 c)d)
x(a(c d)M+(1 c)NK))N .
Numerical examples show this expression can be positive or negative. The latter case implies
pc = pw, with low state market clearing, since it cannot be prot maximising to have rationing in
both states.
22If one rm charges a higher price p, when all others charge bp, the number of consumers, n,
at each low price rm satises S(bp) (K=q(bp)n(N   1)) = S(p). So, (N   1)(dn=dp) = q(bp)(N  
1)2n2=q(p)KS (bp). Taking a rst-order Taylor approximation, the price change required to eliminate
all the deviants customers is therefore q(p)KS (bp) =q(bp)M(N  1)2, which tends to zero as N tends
to innity.
23Bertrand competition with xed capacity is often modelled as involving mixed strategy equi-
libria as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). The reason is that it is implicitly assumed that those
not served at a low price rm can switch to the high price rm. This creates an incentive to raise
price above market clearing. The solution here resembles the market clearing equilibrium in Peck
(2016) for the case of deterministic xed-price per unit.
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Proposition 7 Under ex post consumer choice with the number of rms given, equi-
librium price is below the e¢ cient price if a > a, and is otherwise equal to it.
3 Related work
Carlton (1978) pioneered the analysis of competitive equilibrium in the presence of
stochastic demand and endogenous but predetermined price.24 He notes that the
competitive equilibrium is not welfare maximizing when there is risk aversion or con-
sumers are heterogenious but when these features are absent e¢ ciency is achieved.
Carltons model di¤ers from ours in various respects, such as variable rm capacity
and allowing idiosyncratic shocks as well as aggregate shocks. These are not the rea-
sons for the di¤erent conclusions under risk neutrality and homogeneous consumers.
Carlton restricts deviations to capacity and price pairs that preserve the number of
buyers selecting a seller, presenting an informal dynamic justication (see also Carl-
ton, 1991).25 Our equilibrium allows the number of consumers selecting a seller to
vary, subject to the o¤er remaining competitive in terms of utility.
In a further analysis, Carlton (1979) studies a vertical production chain in a frame-
work with ex ante pricing. There is a private incentive for downstream rms to
vertical integrate in whole or part, which a¤ects the risk borne by the supplying in-
dustry, an externality leading to market failure. Horizontal externalities, the source
of market failure in our analysis, are not examined.
Deneckere and Peck (1995) analyse a set up similar to ours but for unit demand.
Ex post, consumers either value the good at v or not at all with the proportion in the
latter state random. The e¢ ciency of equilibrium is not analysed. Peters (1984) has
smooth demand, but the randomness is due to the law of large numbers not holding
in the mixed stategy buyer equilibrium. Again, welfare is not analyzed. Myatt
and Wallace (2016) study a price setting industry selling di¤erentiated goods under
demand uncertainty. Their primary interest is in the causes and consequences of
information acquisition. It is assumed that rms have quadratic costs, but rationing
is not considered.
Our results have some resemblance to those of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for
non stochastic oligopoly. As price exceeds marginal cost under oligopoly, it is too high
from the viewpoint of social e¢ ciency. Assuming price cannot be regulated, entry
24Optimal stockholding with exogenous prices, sometimes known as the news vendor problem,
can be traced at least to Edgeworth (1888).
25"When rms remain competitive by o¤ering the given level of utility, they randomly receive
their equal share of the L customer" (p. 575).
See also his eq (4), and the discussion in Deneckere and Peck (1995).
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may be excessive or insu¢ cient. The business stealing e¤ect involves the entrant
capturing some of the prot of incumbents, a negative externality. Opposing this,
a new product creates consumer surplus not captured by the entrant, a positive
externality. The divergence between the private and social benet can thus be of
either sign. As the number of rms becomes large (say as xed costs are decreased),
market power shrinks and e¢ ciency prevails. In our model, as the number of rms
increases they become utility takers but market failure generally persists.
4 Conclusions
The market failure analysed here is intrinsic to competitive equilibrium under sto-
chastic demand and ex-ante price setting. Welfare naturally falls short of what is
achievable if price could be adjusted always to clear the market. Our point is di¤er-
ent. Accepting price must be chosen before demand is known, the market normally
fails to provide e¢ cient incentives. Price tends to be excessive given the number of
rms. Though a high price eliminates rationing, which is in itself e¢ cient, it does
so by creating an even worse problem of wasted capacity. Entry signals are also
distorted. Adding a seller relieves rationing, so yields consumer benets not fully
captured by the entrant. Conversely, when demand is low, there is excess capacity.
An entrant obtains their share of revenue in this state though the they create no
social benet. The externalities arising in the two states are independent but o¤set-
ting though only in special cases exactly so. Ine¢ ciency is not due to the nature of
the rationing. Even with e¢ cient rationing, the market equilibrium can be improved
by intervention, as is also true if the order of consumer choice is reversed. The
general message is that stochastic demand implies elements of price setting power,
even though all rms are utility takers. A price change necessarily di¤erentiates a
rms product by a¤ecting rationing probabilities, even if there is no rationing in
equilibrium. Price tends to be too high, with ambiguous e¤ects on the e¢ ciency of
entry decisions. The results can be directly translated into a labor market setting.
If employers post wages before supply conditions are resolved, however competitive
the labor market, wages will tend to be ine¢ ciently low with excessive vacancies.
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Appendix A
Using Bayes rule, the number of customers, m(p; p), choosing the deviant must
satisfy
S =
x
x+ (1  x)f (v   p
)
K
m(p; p)
+

1  x
x+ (1  x)f

(v   p) =
=
x
x+ (1  x)f (v   p)
NK
M
+

1  x
x+ (1  x)f

(v   p).
We have
m(p; p) =
x(v   p)MK
(1  x)f(p   p)M + x(v   p)NK ,
which is equivalent to the expression in (6).
Appendix B
Proof that 1(p; pw) > 0 for all p < pw:
writing p = pw   ",
d
d"
= 1
xN2K( 2(1 x)acM 2(1 x)bcM"+xNK)2 [(1  x)bcM8(1  x)3a3cd2M3+
+(4(1  x)bcM"+ xNK)( 2(1  x)bcM"+ xNK)2+
+2(1  x)aM( 2(1  x)bcM"+ xNK)(2(1  x)bc(3c+ 2d)M"+ xNK(3c  2d))+
+4(1  x)2a2cM2(8(1  x)bcdM"+ xNK(3c  2d))].
This is positive if  2(1 x)bcM"+xNK > 0, which is satised when " < xNK
2(1 x)bcM =
pw, that is, for each p > 0, pw pl = [(2 x)NK 2(1 x)adM ]=[2(1 x)bcM ] < pw.
A few notes on derivations (not for publication)
Derivation of total value of consumption in (14):
the total value of consumption at price p (surplus plus revenue) is:
p(a  bp) + 1
2
(a  bp)  a
b
  p = 1
2b
(a2   b2p2) = (a bp)(a+bp)
2b
.
Derivation of (15):
dW
dp =
1
2
(1 x)(ad  bcp)M   1
2
(1 x)(ad+ bcp)M   1
2
xNK = xNK
2
  (1 x)bcpM .
Derivation of (21):
dS
dm
=
xK
h
p(a bp)  (a bp)(a+bp)
2b
i
(a bp)m2 .
dS
dp =
xK[ 12 (a bp)  12 (a+bp) a+2bp]
(a bp)m +
xbK
h
(a bp)(a+bp)
2b
 p(a bp)
i
(a bp)2m   (1  x)(ad  bcp).
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Simplifying: dm
dp =   b[2(1 x)m(ad bcp
)+xK]m
x(a bp)K .
Derivation of (27):
W (pw(N); N) = 4(1 x)
2a2d2M2 4x(1 x)acMNK x2N2K2
8(1 x)bcM .
dW (pw(N);N)
dN
  C 0(N) = 4x(1 x)acMK+2x2NK2
8(1 x)bcM   C 0(N).
Simplifying: dW (p
w(N);N)
dN
  C 0(N) = xK[2(1 x)acM+xKN ]
4(1 x)bcM   C 0(N).
Derivation of (31):
dS
dm
= x
h
aK
bm2
+ (2am K)K
m2
  pK
bm3
i
.
dS
dp = (1  x)

1
2
(ad  bcp)  1
2
(ad+ bcp) + 2bcp   ad  xK
m
.
Simplifying: dm
dp =   b[(1 x)m(ad bcp
)+xK]m2
x[m(a bp) K]K .
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